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‘Honourable Men’: West
German Industrialists and the
Role of Honour and Honour
Courts in the Adenauer Era
A R M I N G R Ü N B A C H E R
Abstract
This article argues that traditional conceptions of honour and the social practices based on them
were both persistent yet at the same time very fragile and changeable amongst post-war German
steel industrialists. After a brief overview of how bourgeois honour developed up to the early
1950s, a study of the honour court case of one of the leading men of heavy industry, Hermann
Reusch of Gutehoffnungshütte, which ran from 1947 to 1949, will be presented. This is followed
by a description of the ultimately unsuccessful attempt by the Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen und
Stahl to establish honour councils to enforce a price policy across the association. Both cases
highlight the rapidly changing social and economic culture in West Germany in the early 1960s.
The purpose of this article is to explain why and in what forms ‘honour’ and
‘honour courts’ and ‘honour councils’ survived the Nazi perversion of honour
and continued to be used by big business and especially the steel industry well
into the 1960s. Honour courts were set up to deal with serious infringements of
professional rules or professional misconduct and behaviours, while honour councils
act as associational arbitration bodies.1 By investigating honour in this way it is
hoped that the article will contribute to the closing of this gap and lead to a wider
discussion on bourgeois honour after 1945. This article seeks to bring together two
strands of the historiography that have usually been treated separately: the history
Department of History, The University of Birmingham, Birmingham B15 2TT; a.gruenbacher@
bham.ac.uk
I would like to express my thanks to Corey Ross, Gavin Schaffer and Peter Jones for their comments
on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as to the anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Special
thanks also to Holger Nehring for his support.
1 Honour courts still exist today in Germany for the medical and legal professions; honour councils can
be established by societies, clubs or professional associations.
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of the transformation of West German industrialists in the Ruhr area from National
Socialism to democracy in West Germany, and more finely grained social and cultural
histories of the values of the German upper middle class.
Scholarly investigations about ‘honour’ and related topics such as bourgeois
‘habitus’ and duelling see the subject by and large as deriving from the social habits
of the early modern aristocracy, for whom duelling was a means to sustaining their
social status within feudal society. As such, honour is a well-researched topic for
the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth century, both in the European and
German context.2 According to the theory of Max Weber, an outspoken advocate of
duels and a duellist himself, social honour should, because of its feudal origins, lose
its meaning and disappear from everyday life with the creation of a modern market
society.3 Thus, most studies that analyse honour in Germany end either after the
First World War (like Ann Goldberg’s study) or immediately after the Second World
War (Ute Frevert’s work, for example). Only very few studies go beyond 1945, and
those that do focus primarily on social roles and attitudes rather than honour and
its significance for group interaction. James Whitman’s study, for example, looks at
the origins of, and differences between, the German, French and United States legal
cultures of litigation, and personal insults and civility. He provides excellent insights
and very good descriptions of German attitudes, habits and reactions towards real or
perceived insults and violations of honour, and how significant their impact remained
on the judicial system in the second half of the twentieth century. Similarly, Paul Betts’s
essay investigates how the ‘other German’ society, the German Democratic Republic
(GDR), negotiated property disputes and defamation of honour during the 1950s and
1960s.4 For the Federal Republic of Germany, Winfried Speitkamp’s recent cultural
history of honour is the only work that explores the post-1945 honour culture in
any detail. In his view, despite the 1945 caesura caused by the Nazi perversion of
the term ‘honour’, honour was neither a relict nor an anachronism in the post-war
period, but still a creative force, not least because, as he succinctly puts it, ‘honour
creates status’.5
There are recent studies on the continuity and evolution of German ‘big business’
across the 1945 divide. More detailed studies have by now overtaken Volker Berghahn’s
2 See, for example, Norbert Elias, The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Century, trans. Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell, ed. Michael Schröter
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); Ute Frevert, Men of Honour: A Social and Cultural History of the Duel
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 2; Winfried Speitkamp, Ohrfeige, Duell, Ehrenmord: Eine Geschichte
der Ehre (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2010), 10; James Q. Whitman, ‘Civility and Respect: Three Societies’,
The Yale Law Journal, 109, 6 (2000), 1279–398, here 1285; Ann Goldberg, Honour, Politics and the Law
in Imperial Germany, 1871–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1–2. Robert A. Nye’s
Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1993) provides an excellent study on France before the First World War. The classic sociological
study of Mediterranean honour is still J. Peristiany’s edited volume Honour and Shame: The Values of
Mediterranean Society (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965).
3 Frevert, Men of Honour, 2–4; Goldberg, Honour, 5.
4 Paul Betts, ‘Property, Peace and Honour: Neighbourhood Justice in Communist Berlin’, Past and
Present, 201 (2008), 215–54.
5 Speitkamp, Ohrfeige, 17, 22 (all translations are the author’s).
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1985 ground-breaking study on lines of continuation between pre- and post-1945
German industrialists. Paul Erker, for example, concludes that the amazing thing
about German industrialists in the post-war period is not the discontinuity in
personnel but the continuity in mentality and attitudes. Richard Tilly’s monograph
on Willy Schlieker, throwing light on this from a different angle, is a prime example of
how the career of a newcomer could be terminated by more established industrialists
harbouring old resentments.6 Schlieker had been working for the Speer ministry and,
when not even thirty years old, had been responsible for raw material allocation to
the Ruhr steel plants where he made enemies amongst the traditional elites of the
Ruhr. After the war he had become one of the faces of the ‘economic miracle’ before
he had to declare bankruptcy in 1962. Still, none of these more recent studies deal
with ‘honour’, which, considering how important honour had been to the bourgeois
habitus, leaves a considerable gap in our understanding of this group’s honour after
1945. Bernhard Rieger used files from law courts for his study on the Volkswagen
saving scheme but this article relies on an underused set of sources from company
archives to argue that traditional conceptions of honour and the social practices based
on them were both persistent yet at the same time very fragile and variable in post-
war Germany.7 The article’s first section provides a brief overview of how bourgeois
honour developed up to the early 1950s; the second part presents a study of the
honour court case of Hermann Reusch of Gutehoffnungshütte, one of Germany’s
biggest steel manufacturing conglomerates, which ran from 1947–9.8 The short-lived
revival and eventual failure of honour councils, as described in section three, reflect
the rapidly changing social and economic culture in West Germany in the early
1960s, when traditional group loyalty and honour began to disappear. However, as
Speitkamp has shown, this did not mean that ‘honour’ as a social concept disappeared
altogether within the Federal Republic.9
Following Speitkamp, ‘honour’ will be understood as a code of conduct and
instrument of social or, more precisely, group control.10 By showing that honour was
used to influence the behaviour of individuals within a group so as not to act against
perceived group interests, this article will demonstrate that honour is a concept
6 Volker Berghahn, Unternehmer und Politik in der Bundesrepublik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985); Paul
Erker, ‘Einleitung: Industrieeliten im 20 Jahrhundert’, in Paul Erker, Toni Pierenkämper, eds, Deutsche
Unternehmer zwischen Kriegswirtschaft und Wiederaufbau: Studien zur Erfahrungsbildung von Industrie-Eliten
(Munich: Oldenbourg, 1999), 18; Richard Tilly, Willy H. Schlieker: Aufstieg und Fall eines Unternehmers
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2008).
7 Bernhard Rieger uses files from law courts for his study on the Volkswagen trial in which citizens who
had participated in the NS Volkswagen saving scheme before and during the war sued the company for
compensation for their lost savings instalments. Bernhard Rieger, ‘Schulden der Vergangenheit? Der
Mamut-prozess der Volkswagensparer, 1949–1961’, in Friedrich Kießling, Bernhard Rieger, eds, Mit
dem Wandel leben: Neuorientierung und Tradition in der Bundesrepublik der 1950er und 60er Jahre (Cologne:
Böhlau, 2011), 185–208.
8 For an overview of all the GHH companies, see Dietrich Wilhelm von Menges,
Unternehmensentscheide: Ein Leben für die Wirtschaft (Dusseldorf: Eccon, 1976); see the inside cover
for the pre- and post-1945 company structure.
9 Speitkamp, Ohrfeige, in particular chs 1 and 6.
10 Ibid., 11, 22.
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relating to social practice which, in the case of German heavy industry, changed
during the industry’s social modernisation in the 1950s and 60s.
The development of bourgeois honour
‘Honour’ was first used in the German lands in the context of economic relations in
the seventeenth century. Then, the term ehrbahrer Kaufmann, honourable merchant,
was used when Hamburg Hansa merchants set up a traders’ deputation to the city’s
administration.11 Germany’s early industrial families like the Haniels or the Krupps
usually had some background in trade and would have adhered to this tradition
of conducting honest business and would have seen it as part of their bourgeois
reputation and entrepreneurial honour.12 With the growth of companies and the rise
of salaried executives the honour of the company became independent of that of its
owners and their personal conduct.13 This change in attitude can be observed in the
conduct of big steel magnates like August Thyssen, Hugo Stinnes and others well
into the early twentieth century and in the tight-knit community of the Ruhr would
have also influenced the outlook and self-perception of their successors.14
During the nineteenth century, honour courts had been established in the
professions. For journalists, lawyers and doctors, this meant a professionalisation and
modernisation of their work. It also allowed for emancipation from state authority and
oversight while it established a minimum of professional standards and ‘honourable
conduct’ both in professional and private life, with clear rules of conduct and expected
behaviour.15 In the commercial sector, this formal development occurred to a much
lesser degree. Only following a number of business scandals in the wake of the
1923 hyperinflation and then the Wall Street Crash, which tainted the reputation of
businessmen, did Berlin merchants call for the introduction of merchants’ honour
courts.16 Between 1933 and 1935, there were increased efforts to establish such honour
courts. But because almost all chambers of commerce had their own approach on the
matter, it took until 1935 to find a definition which was accepted in the whole country
and for most sectors of the economy. The introduction of honour courts was partly
11 Theodor Bohner, Der ehrbare Kaufmann: VomWerden undWirken deutscher Wirtschaft (Hamburg: Meiner
Verlag, 1956), vii–viii.
12 For the Haniel family see Harold James, Family Capitalism: Wendels, Haniels, Falcks, and the Continental
European Model (Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). For Krupp see most recently Harold
James, Krupp: A History of the Legendary Firm (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012).
13 Friedrich Zunkel, ‘Ehre’, in Otto Brunner et al., eds, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Vol. 2 (Stuttgart:
Klett-Cotta, 1975), 1–63, here 49.
14 Jeffrey R. Fear, Organizing Control: August Thyssen and the Construction of German Corporate Management
(Harvard MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Gerald D. Feldman, Hugo Stinnes: Biographie eines
Industriellen 1870–1924 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1998).
15 Goldberg, Honour, 63.
16 Christof Biggeleben, ‘Kontinuität von Bürgerlichkeit im Berliner Unternehmertum: Der Verein
Berliner Kaufleute und Industrieller (1879–1961)’, in Volker R. Berghahn, Stefan Unger, Dieter
Ziegler, eds, Die westdeutsche Wirtschaftselite im 20. Jahrhundert: Kontinuität und Mentalität (Essen:
Klartext, 2003), 241–74, here 260–1.
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a move by the established merchants to mark themselves off from the perceived (or
real) greed of the nouveaux riches, who had benefited from the war, the hyperinflation
or the economic depression. At the same time, and in line with what Norbert Elias
has argued, this has to be seen as an attempt to try to keep the newcomers in a
position of lower status within the group they had moved into.17 According to the
1935 definition, an honourable merchant is someone ‘who subordinates himself and
supports the idea of work in and for the common weal through his comments, actions
and omissions’.18 This clearly refers to the nineteenth-century bourgeois honour code
which prevented professionals from ‘making money’. The bourgeois honour code
allowed only ‘modest’ profits and wealth, but not greed, which members of the
bourgeoisie regarded as an aristocratic vice.19 This observation is in line with the
argument by Robert Locke: he claims that there existed a fundamental difference
in the business philosophies of German and US firms: the latter regarded their
companies as ‘cash cows’, whereas the former saw them as ‘living entities’ which had
to be nurtured. Profits should be made for the company’s benefit, not for the owner’s
gain. The Krupp company was perhaps the most prominent example of this attitude.
After the Second World War, the big companies in Germany were also restrained
from unfretted capitalism by the co-determination laws.20
Over the course of the nineteenth century, and in particular after 1871, ‘honour’
increasingly became a dominant term in German language and society. The
bourgeoisie especially began to defend their honour, more specifically their public
reputation, either by litigation and suing for libel, or by challenging the person who
caused the insult to a duel, which was standard practice amongst military officers and
university students.21
After the First World War duels amongst officers practically disappeared in line
with the reduction of the officer corps after the Treaty of Versailles. But rapier and
sometimes even sabre duels amongst students continued to be highly popular despite
massive, albeit futile, attempts by some authorities to abolish these ‘class-based’ sports.
Indeed, of all the student societies, the duelling fraternities had the best recruiting
results, claiming up to 60% of all student society members in the inter-war years.22
It was these young men who attended university in the inter-war period who would
become the managerial elite in Germany after the Second World War. The official
17 Elias, The Germans, 46.
18 Biggeleben, ‘Kontinuität’, 265–6.
19 Goldberg, Honour, 64. Christina von Hodenberg, ‘Der Fluch des Geldsacks: Der Aufstieg
der Industriellen als Herausforderung bürgerlicher Werte’, in Manfred Hettling, Stefan-Ludwig
Hoffmann, eds,Der bürgerlicheWertehimmel: Innenansichten des 19. Jahrhunderts (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck
and Ruprecht, 2000), 79–103.
20 Robert R. Locke, ‘Mistaking a historical phenomenon for a functional one: post-war management
education reconsidered’, in Lars Engwall, Vera Zamagni, eds, Management Education in Historical
Perspective (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998), 145–56, here 149. For Krupp see James,
Krupp. On the debate about a different ‘German capitalism’ see Volker Berghahn, Sigurt Vitols,
eds, Gibt es einen deutschen Kapitalismus? Tradition und globale Perspektiven der sozialen Marktwirtschaft
(Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag, 2006).
21 See Goldberg, Honour.
22 Frevert, Men of Honour, 212.
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portraits of top executives after the Second World War who had attended university
during the interwar years speak for themselves: virtually all showed visible duelling
scars which they still wore as a badge of honour.23 As the most striking example of this,
one can name none other than the first president (1949–1971) of the influential and
powerful Federation of German Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie,
BDI), Fritz Berg. When Berg visited the United States of America on a study trip
during the 1920s, a New York newspaper referred to him because of his duelling
scars, quite unflatteringly, as a ‘typical German beer student’.24
Frevert points out that former members of student duelling societies dropped
the practice quickly once they had left university, to find more ‘normal’ ways of
upholding their bourgeois sense of honour.25 This change in style did not mean that
the former students and their fellow bourgeois merchants and industrialists gave up
their traditional sense of honour and their outward claim to honourableness, as the
middle classes initiated 80,000 libel cases a year.26 Speitkamp argues that the meaning
of honour changed after 1933 with National Socialist ideology. Before the First World
War, honour was seen by the German middle classes as a basic right that had to be
defended in duels or in litigation. Under the Nazis honour became a national duty
where personal honour became linked to the honour of the community and nation,
and the highest form of honour became perverted into dying for the nation. The flip
side of the Nazis’ over-glorification of honour was the denial of honour to political
opponents and racial others, in particular for Jews. Thus honour became a tool to
create and shape the social and racial order of the Nazi regime (Volksgemeinschaft), in
which any form of deviance from the set norm could be checked and eliminated.27
Their involvement with the Nazi war economy and their indictment after 1945
for crimes against humanity had compromised the respectability of businessmen, so
they attempted to clear their names and re-establish their honour as a group. The
internment of German industrialists by Allied forces after the Second World War
and the subsequent war crimes trials against some of them came as a huge shock
to the men indicted and to German industrialists as a whole. In his biographical
study of ‘captains of industry’, Alexander von Plato speculates that living through
the internment, which they experienced as degrading and contemptuous, caused an
23 See, for example, the portraits in Fritz Pudor, Lebensbilder aus dem Rheinisch-Westfälischen Industriegebiet:
Jahrgang 1962–1967 (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1977). For the growing number of university-educated
top managers see Armin Grünbacher, ‘The Americanisation that never was? The First Decade of
the Baden-Badener Unternehmergespräche, 1954–1964 and Top Management Training in 1950s
Germany’, Business History 54, 2 (2012) 245–61. Although these figures are for industry as a whole,
one has to remember that heavy industry was still dominated by the university-trained Bergassessoren
(government certified mining engineers and inspectors), while on the commercial side, many board
members had law degrees.
24 Achim Schulte Goebel, ‘Fritz Berg 1901–1979: Unternehmer und Industriepräsident in der Adenauer
Ära’, Ph.D. thesis, University of Dusseldorf, 1999, 11
25 Frewert, Men of Honour, 218–9.
26 Speitkamp, Ohrfeige, 176.
27 Ibid., 192–3, 201–13.
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insecurity leading to a new thinking amongst industrialists.28 Jonathan Wiesen has
argued convincingly that although most businessmen (apart from those convicted at
Nuremberg) would eventually be cleared, on appeal, of active involvement with the
Nazis by German denazification panels, they were outraged by the arrests and trials.
They were deeply humiliated and affected in their nineteenth-century bourgeois
self-conception. This can be seen especially well in the account of Hans-Günther
Sohl. The post-war chairman of the Thyssen steel group spent ten pages in his
memoirs describing his internment.29 If one turns from this fact to Konrad Jarausch’s
suggestion of how ‘social-cultural changes’ came about, that is, out of individual daily
experiences, then living though the incarceration can be understood as the start of
a series of changes in the industrialists’ social and cultural values and norms, which
arose from their everyday experiences after the war.30
While the sentencing for war crimes at the Nuremberg War Crimes trials – most
prominently of Alfried Krupp – and Krupp’s expropriation came as a shock to the
whole German business community, it was also the starting point for a concerted
drive by some steel industrialists to restore what they regarded as their collective
honour.31 The campaign’s sharpest tool was public relations and in particular the
commissioned publication of new biographies of industrialists and entrepreneurs.32
Apart from Louis P. Lochner’s Tycoons and Tyrant, which was heavily sponsored
by, amongst others, the Iron and Steel Association (Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen
und Stahl – WVES from now on), the most notorious of these books, perhaps,
were those written by Gert von Klass. Von Klass produced a series of unashamedly
hagiographic biographies of Albert Vögler and Hugo Stinnes and similarly glorifying
company histories, for example of Friedrich Krupp AG.33 In his excellent study on
how companies or surviving ‘friends’ had commissioned these books, Kim Priemel
has shed light on how industrialists used the books as a justification for their own
actions.34 The German Industry Institute (Deutsches Industrie-Institut, DI), a body
set up in 1951 by a variety of German companies and industrial organisations drawn
particularly from heavy industry, has to be seen as the most influential and successful
28 Alexander von Plato, ‘“Wirtschaftskapitäne”: Biographische Selbstkonstruktionen von Unternehmern
in der Nachkriegszeit’, in Axel Schildt, Arnold Sywottek, eds, Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die
Westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre (Bonn: Dietz, 1998), 379, 387.
29 Jonathan Wiesen, West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past (Chapel Hill, NC: University
of North Carolina Press, 2001), 52–93 and esp. 68. Hans-Günther Sohl, Notizen (private printing,
1983), 98–107.
30 Konrad Jarausch, Die Umkehr: Deutsche Wandlungen 1945–1995 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische
Bildung, 2004), 9.
31 Wiesen, West German Industry, 97.
32 Ibid., 131–56.
33 Louis P. Lochner, Tycoons and Tyrant: German Industry from Hitler to Adenauer (Chigago: Henry
Regenery, 1954); Gert von Klass, Die drei Ringe: Lebensgeschichte des Industrieunternehmens Krupp
(Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1953); Albert Vögler: Einer der Großen des Ruhrreviers (Tübingen: Wunderlich,
1957); Hugo Stinnes (Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1958). On the sponsorship see Thyssen-Krupp
Konzernarchiv (henceforth TKA and file number) A/30412, Ahrens to Sohl, 28 Feb. 1955.
34 Kim Christian Priemel, ‘Gekaufte Geschichte: Der “Freundeskreis Albert Vögler”, Gert von
Klass und die Entwicklung der historischen Unternehmerforschung nach 1945’, Zeitschrift für
Unternehmensgeschichte, 52 (2007), 177–202.
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organisation in this process of reclaiming the industrialists’ ‘honour’.35 It was the
DI which supported and subsidised with a considerable sum of money a revised
edition of Theodor Bohner’s Der ehrbare Kaufmann (‘The honourable merchant’).
First published in 1936, the book was a hagiography, written in an accessible style,
of the ingenuity, industriousness and integrity of German merchants, bankers and
industrialists from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries.36 It glorified the work of
the ‘honest merchant’ and of leading companies from all sectors of the economy, in
particular those from heavy industry, and what they had done and were still doing
for their community and country. In retrospect, the revised edition has to be seen as
an attempt to restore industrialists’ reputation, image and honour in the public eye
by linking the businessmen and companies of the past with those of the ‘economic
miracle’, and the ‘honourable merchant’ of history with the ‘honourable’ men of the
present. Christof Biggeleben points out that the term ‘merchant’ was used instead of
‘industrialist’, particularly because after 1945 the latter was associated with the term
Grosskapitalist (big capitalist; the underlying ideological charge of the German term
gets lost in translation), which itself was close to a synonym for a Nazi supporter.
At the same time the term ‘merchant’ helped to cover up growing differences and
conflicts between industrialists and merchants.37 The industrialists’ endeavours to
exonerate themselves can scarcely be considered as an attempt to deal with their
involvement with the Nazi regime. Coming to terms with the past, either by a
company or by an industrial group, began on a significant scale only in the 1990s.
Prior to this, any involvement with the Nazis had either been played down and
trivialised or covered up. As Wiesen has shown, this was not done out of a feeling
of guilt. The industrialists took their actions chiefly in an attempt to restore their
collective honour, which they thought had been blemished unjustifiably.
The Reusch-Kirchfeld case
The honour court case of Hermann Reusch which dragged on for almost two years
from 1947–9 gives an insight into the significance honour still had for the leading
man of the Ruhr industry. Reusch had been one of the very few industrialists
who were not detained by the Allies and, because of this and his background at
Gutehoffnungshütte, he became one of most influential (but also controversial) figures
amongst German industrialists. Up to 1945, Gutehoffnungshütte had been a trust
second only to the giant Vereinigte Stahlwerke, with interests in coal, steelmaking and
steel manufacturing. After the war, the Allies split the company, against strong German
resistance, into a coal-mining operation, a steel maker, a trading house and, the most
prized asset, the manufacturing trust which kept the name of Gutehoffnungshütte
Aktienverein.38
35 Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv (henceforth RWWA), 130/40010146/307 and 308, passim.
36 Bohner, Der ehrbare Kaufmann, viii.
37 Biggeleben, ‘Kontinuität’, 268–9.
38 See von Menges, Unternehmensentscheide, on the inside cover, for the pre- and post-1945 company
structure.
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In one of the few existing autobiographical accounts by a post-war industrialist,
Dietrich Wilhelm von Menges, chairman of Gutehoffnungshütte from 1966 to 1975,
gives a brief and not entirely accurate account of the honour court procedures,
which had the following background.39 In 1942, Paul Reusch, chairman of the board
of managers of the holding company Gutehoffnungshütte Aktienverein since 1909,
had been forced to leave his post due to ever growing Nazi pressure because of his
opposition to the regime.40 Reusch’s son Hermann, also a member of the managing
board and destined to become his successor, resigned out of solidarity. Untainted by
any Nazi connection, Hermann Reusch returned to the company leadership in 1945.
He then accused fellow board member Franz Kirchfeld, who during the war also held
the post of state secretary in the Economics Ministry, of having briefed the Nazis
against Reusch senior. Although Kirchfeld, who also had been tipped as a future
chairman of the board of managers, resigned from the board of Gutehoffnungshütte
steel plant on 31 March 1946, he stayed on as board member of the Aktienverein
and initially as chairman of Gutehoffnungshütte subsidiary company Ferrostaal.41
Throughout 1947 Hermann Reusch continued his overt and covert campaign against
Kirchfeld. He completely ignored Kirchfeld by refusing any meeting or telephone
conversation with him. Reusch did not inform von Menges in detail about his
allegations against Kirchfeld till October 1947, but he seems to have spelled out the
allegations to Kirchfeld himself only in November, and subsequently authorised von
Menges to act as a go-between and mediator.42 At the centre of Reusch’s allegations
stood the claim of ‘disloyalty’ against Reusch senior by conspiring with Werner Carp
and Wolfgang Curtius, both from a different branch of the Haniel family which
owned Gutehoffnungshütte and outspoken opponents of Paul Reusch, to get him
removed.43
Kirchfeld, who had been mentored by Paul Reusch and claimed to have always
been loyal to him, denied the accusations. Eventually, in April 1948 he declared that
he felt insulted in his honour and demanded that the case be resolved immediately. By
August 1948, the two men (who during their student days had both been members
of duelling student societies) had been able to agree on and establish an honour
court which was to resolve the dispute for good.44 From the surviving documents the
39 Von Menges, Unternehmensentscheide, 104–5.
40 Gutehoffnungshütte Aktienverein was the holding company of which the steel works of similar name,
Gutehoffnungshütte AG Oberhausen, was a subsidiary. For board membership of the holding and
subsidiary companies see Johannes Bähr, Ralf Banken, Thomas Flemming, Die MAN: Eine deutsche
Industriegeschichte, 3rd edn (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2009), 286.
41 Benjamin Obermüller, ‘“Auf einen groben Klotz gehört ein grober Keil.” Hermann Reuschs
Kampf gegen Dr Franz Kirchfeld 1947–1950’, Historische Gesellschaft Oberhausen, ed., Ursprünge
und Entwicklungen der Stadt Oberhausen, Band 8 (Oberhausen, 2009), 119–33, here 121.
42 Obermüller, ‘“Auf einen groben Klotz”’, 123.
43 Benjamin Obermüller, ‘Hermann Reusch und die Beziehungen zur Eigentümerfamilie Haniel’, in
Susanne Hilger, Ulrich S. Soénius, eds, Familienunternehmen im Rheinland im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert,
Schriften zur rheinisch-westfälischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Vol. 47 (Cologne: Stiftung Rheinisch-
Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, 2009), 159–74, here 164–8. For the Haniel/Carp family tree see Harold
James, Family Capitalism, 390–2.
44 Obermüller, ‘“Auf einen groben Klotz”’, 124–5.
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conclusion has to be drawn that there were no set rules for such a course of action.
Reusch did send to his second an excerpt of the ‘Honour and Weapons Code of the
Association of Former Corps Students’ (‘Ehren- und Waffenordnung des Verbandes Alter
Corpsstudenten’), which outlined the rules for pistol and sabre duels. Although this
approach to conflict settlement seems ludicrous from today’s perspective, Whitman
points out that, even if they were an exception, the last two duels fought in France
occurred in 1958 and 1967 respectively.45 Instead of duelling, Reusch and Kirchfeld
agreed to the establishment of an honour court. It was to be made up of one
second from each side to which the opponents would sent written statements in
response to their opponent’s case.46 Reusch’s second and honour court representative
was his friend Otto Meyer, chairman of another Gutehoffnungshütte subsidiary, the
manufacturing company Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg (MAN). Meyer, who
had been in charge of MAN since 1935, had kept his distance from the Nazis, partly
because his mentor Paul Reusch had done so, but even more so because of his Jewish
wife, which had made him a personal target of the Nazi Gauleiter of Franconia,
Julius Streicher. In 1945, Meyer avoided arrest and deportation to a labour camp
only because of the chaos of the Nazi collapse.47 Kirchfeld’s nominee was Walter Voss
of the Mühlheim wire cable company Kox.48 In the process of the honour court
proceedings, Reusch was not able to substantiate any of his claims against Kirchfeld
with anything other than hearsay. He even had to retract some of his allegations and
instead focus his accusations more and more on Kirchfeld’s Nazi party membership.49
With even Reusch’s colleagues and confidants, including the Nazi opponent Meyer,
making statements in support of Kirchfeld (but certainly none against him), the
honour court in May 1949 declared Reusch’s accusation unproven and Kirchfeld’s
honour restored. Despite this clear outcome, Kirchfeld had to give up both his board
membership at Gutehoffnungshütte Aktienverein and at Ferrostaal, and had to leave
the company for good, receiving only a pittance as compensation.50
The case and its aftermath highlight two aspects of the importance of ‘honour’
for West German steel industrialists: first, they demonstrate how important ‘honour’
was to the industrial elite. The honour court explicitly confirmed that both men
had acted out of ‘honourable motives’.51 Over-ambition and disloyalty were the two
attributes most disliked in the Ruhr community, as the cases of Adolf Fry, a Krupp
deputy director, and of Walter Rohland, chairman of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke, both
demonstrate. Fry had been dismissed without notice in 1934 after having briefed
against colleagues; and Rohland was the only Vereinigte Stahlwerke board member
who could not continue his career after the war because his colleagues regarded
45 Whitman, ‘Civility’, 1360.
46 MAN Archive A1.3.3.5 (Nachlass Otto Meyer). I am much obliged and very grateful to Professor
Johannes Bähr for providing me with these details.
47 Bähr, Banken, Flemming, Die MAN, 285, 290, 314.
48 Ibid.; von Menges, Unternehmerentscheide, 105. No further details could be found about Voss.
49 Obermüller, ‘“Auf einen groben Klotz”’, 126–8.
50 Ibid., 128–9.
51 Bähr, Banken, Flemming, Die MAN, 313.
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him as over-ambitious.52 With his honour restored, Kirchfeld was able to set up his
own successful trading and industrial services company, which would have been near
impossible had the disloyalty claims been proven.
Second, business interests, in this case the interests of the Haniel family over
the Carp/Curtius branch of the clan on how to run the company, ultimately still
overruled matters of honour. The fact that Kirchfeld had to leave the company had
not much to do with his Nazi party membership. There were too many managers with
a similar past (even within the relatively ‘under -Nazified’ Gutehoffnungshütte) who
were continuing their careers in post-war Germany, but only in Kirchfeld’s case did
Curt Haniel express his displeasure regarding Nazi party membership.53 It is, therefore,
obvious that there was another reason for Haniel’s bias in the affair, in which he refused
Kirchfeld the opportunity to justify himself while Haniel continued to consult with
Reusch. The reason was Haniel’s close relationship with Reusch, father and son. Both
had regarded themselves as ‘major-domos’ of the Haniel family, fulfilling this role
always in the interest of the family and at times even to the detriment of the company.54
The Haniels had good reasons to support Hermann Reusch, who himself had a
tense relationship with the Carp/Curtius line since they disliked Reusch’s running
of the company.55 By supporting Reusch and making him undisputed chairman of
the board, Haniel strengthened his own position in the family power struggle. For
Reusch, who at the time really seems to have believed in Kirchfeld’s disloyalty, the
eventual dismissal of his opponent had the additional benefit of thwarting the potential
challenge of a likely and competent rival for the company chairmanship. In any case,
what is striking about this incident is the fact that both men eventually accepted and
submitted to the ruling of an honour court that had been set up as a body for the
protection and restoration of the honour of one of the protagonists. Non-compliance
with the verdict, for example by pursuing legal redress, would have had considerable
consequences for either man’s reputation. For Kirchfeld, accepting it offered at least
a chance of a new start outside of Gutehoffnungshütte. Von Menges describes how
eventually in the 1960s both men became reconciled and acknowledged restored
honour.56 As far as could be ascertained, the Reusch-Kirchfeld case was the last of
its kind amongst industrialists in which an honour court was set up to deal with
matters of reputation. From now on those affairs would either be settled through
mediation by friends and business associations or they would be handled in a court of
law.
52 James, Krupp, 193; Priemel, ‘Gekaufte Geschichte’, 191–2.
53 Obermüller, ‘“Auf einen groben Klotz”’, 122; for party membership in the Gutehoffnungsütte
companies see Bähr, Banken, Flemming, Die MAN, 283–91.
54 Obermüller, ‘Hermann Reusch und die Beziehungen’, 160.
55 Ibid., 164–5.
56 Von Menges, Unternehmentsentscheide, 105.
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The Honour Council of the Iron and Steel Association
During the 1950s, the adherence to what was regarded as honourable behaviour,
notably with respect to traditional group loyalty, underwent significant changes as the
next example, the honour council of the WVES, will demonstrate. It is here where,
in the wake of the declining influence of the previous cartel and association discipline,
changing attitudes and a cultural shift under the ‘Social Market Economy’ become
obvious. The traditional industrial group loyalty and the honour of individuals within
the group that was linked to this form of loyalty (Treue) changed significantly during
the late 1950s and the 1960s.
In February 1957, the Federation of German Industry announced in one of their
circulars that guidelines for the establishment of industrial honour courts, which had
been drafted in co-operation with the Federation of German Employers’ Organisation
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA), would be announced
soon.57 On the part of Wilhelm Ahrens, general secretary (Hauptgeschäftsführer) of the
Iron and Steel Association, this announcement was not welcome.58 Ahrens did not
like the idea of setting up a cross-association body with the employers’ association as
suggested in the initial BDI honour court guidelines because it would have unbalanced
the association’s difficult social policy conditions. The big steel companies with more
than 1000 employees operated under the 1952 co-determination law, which meant
that their supervisory boards had to be made up of five representatives each of capital
and labour and one neutral member. The small and medium-sized companies, which
made up the majority of association members, were not subject to the law, and they
feared that co-determination might be introduced to the industry as a whole through
the back door. This was one of the main reasons why the Iron and Steel Association
had kept its distance from both the BDI and BDA, and Ahrens considered this special
role to be under threat if they had to provide panel members for the honour courts
and also, more importantly, had to accept more union-friendly BDA members into
their own courts. For the WVES, this was also a way to demonstrate their ‘special’ role
within German industry, which, as Werner Plumpe has demonstrated, they regained
for a brief period during the reconstruction period of the 1950s.59
As Christof Biggeleben has established for the Berlin merchants, looking after
their own in an hour of need was regarded as a duty of honour. During the 1930s,
under the banner of ‘honour duty’, the Berlin merchants recapitalised and financed a
merchants’ old age pensioners’ home which had suffered and lost its assets during the
inflation period; and despite the desperate economic situation in post-war Berlin, by
the early 1950s, the ‘Emergency Fund for Merchants in Economic Distress’ (Notkasse
57 TKA A/30413, Diskussionsabend, Ahrens to Sohl, 12 March 1957, Appendix 13 for the forthcoming
Diskussionsabend.
58 Ibid., also for the following sentence. The existence of the guidelines could not be verified.
59 Werner Plumpe, ‘Unternehmerverbände und industrielle Interessenpolitik’, in Wolfgang Köllmann,
Hermann Korte, Dietmar Petzina, Wolfhart Weber, eds, Das Ruhrgebiet im Industriezeitalter: Geschichte
und Entwicklung, Vol. 1 (Dusseldorf: Schwann, 1990), 655–727.
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für notleidende Kaufleute) had once again raised DM 600,000 capital for its cause.60
The same attitude can be seen with the WVES as well, since Ruhr industrialists
also saw it as a matter of honour to look after their own when they had fallen on
hard times. This happened for the first time right after the war’s end when the steel
industrialists set up a support fund for the widow of Jakob Reichert, the general
secretary of the WVES’s predecessor body, after he had committed suicide in 1948.61
The WVES acted in a very similar way to enhance the welfare of its own members.
This also applied to members’ surviving dependent relatives, as in the case of Reichert
and in that of a former Gutehoffnungshütte employee who, on behalf of and at the
request of the steel industry, had joined the High Authority of the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) and had died in a work-related car crash. Although
the widow would have received her late husband’s ECSC salary for another three
months, the WVES felt obliged to cover the funeral costs and to provide a pension
for her as well. The emotional language used in the minutes of the meeting reveals
indeed that they saw it as their duty to do this, the minutes emphasising that the
WVES ‘must not be petty’ (‘darf nicht kleinlich sein’).62
While the social component of the WVES’s self-perception of honour as displayed
in this example remained intact, group loyalty, the ‘honourable’ conduct of businesses
and the keeping of association agreements increasingly deteriorated once market
conditions worsened and competition got tougher. By 1960, actual production output
had reached record levels. The competition to sell steel products had become fierce,
however, resulting in constant price concessions and undercutting of the agreed price
lists by practically all the steel plants. This lack of interest in the common weal of the
association is evident from the rise in cases of indiscretion. This upward trend began
after the 1957 federal elections, in which the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
had won an absolute majority. The WVES’s intended price rises after the elections
could not be fully realised because they had been leaked in advance, which had put
the association’s chairman Sohl in the difficult position of having to explain the price
rises to the federal government. All the WVES could do was to bemoan the event
as a ‘regrettable sign of a lack of common spirit’.63 This incident would be only the
beginning of acts against the informal common honour code as it had existed. In
February 1958, Ahrens expressed his utter shock and disbelief about the fact that one
of ten top men in the steel industry to which he had sent confidential materials had
leaked them. In face of such a lack of integrity, he considered no longer circulating the
materials in advance in future.64 On 7 November 1961, in a meeting of the ‘Discussion
Evening’ (Diskussionsabend, DA), the WVES’s highly confidential co-ordinating body
60 Biggeleben, ‘Kontinuität’, 265, 272. For the economic situation of Berlin’s industry, see Armin
Grünbacher, ‘Sustaining the Island: Western aid to 1950s Berlin’, Cold War History, 3, 3 (2003), 1–22.
61 Helmut Uebbing, Stahl schreibt Geschichte: 125 Jahre Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl (Dusseldorf: Verlag
Stahleisen, 1999), 27.
62 Archiv der Christlich Demokratischen Politik (henceforth ADCP), Nachlass Herbert Köhler, 01–224
– 222/1, (Diskussionsabend (DA) 1954–1956), note on the DA on 6 March 1956.
63 TKA A/30415, Ahrens to Sohl, 30 Nov. 1957, Appendix 1c.
64 TKA A/30346, Ahrens to Schroeder, 18 Feb. 1968.
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in which the owners or top managers of the big steel plants discussed their strategy, a
new low point was reached. Sohl, the DA’s chairman, in an attempt to force a debate,
probably deliberately provoked the industrialists in attendance to blame each other
for breaking all existing agreements to which they had given their word, resulting in
adverse effects for heavy industry as a whole. Accusations went so far as allegations
of lying to the sub-associations’ general secretaries. For thirty tumultuous minutes,
further insults were dished out against each other, with the sub-associations’ general
secretaries being called ‘Würstchen’ (literally: little sausage; diminutive: poor soul,
nobody) and even ‘Hanswürstchen’ (‘clowns’). Wolff von Amerongen, owner of the
Otto Wolff steel trading house, had given this agenda point the plain and embarrassing
heading ‘mudslinging’ (‘Dreckwerfen’), since he felt himself attacked because the steel
trading houses, of which his Otto Wolff company was one of the biggest, were
accused of breaking agreements.65
The lack of civility and the language used in this confrontation are astonishing,
particularly since it happened amongst a group of people who were so concerned
about their honour and reputation. Any one of the insults used in the meeting
described by Wolff von Amerongen (‘liar’, ‘Würstchen’ or ‘Hanswürstchen’) could
easily have lead to a civil court action on the part of the insulted party for the sullying
of honour.66 A good example of how sensitively they reacted whenever their honour
and reputation were at stake had become visible in 1958, when the DA felt compelled
to discuss the rumour that the metal workers’ trade union had given DM 30,000
towards the making of the film Das Mädchen Rosemarie. It was the story of post-war
Germany’s most famous prostitute, Rosemarie Nitribitt, who had been murdered in
1957, with strong allegations that top industrialists had frequented her on a regular
basis.67 Any rumours of disreputable conduct or, worse, that they had links to this
high-profile murder case were most unwelcome.
While the outburst described by Wolff von Amerongen in November 1961 seemed
to have cleared the air for the time being, by the summer of 1963 the WVES had
decided that it was necessary to establish an honour council for its most important sub-
association, the Rolled Steel Association (Walzstahl-Vereinigung). This step was not
an attempt to control manners and punish verbal or other forms of social misconduct,
but an attempt to stop price dumping, which had become common practice. The
honour council was set up to keep the rolled steel companies in line with the
association’s pricing policy, which had been agreed at the DA. In order to be able to
do so, the council was allowed to investigate any infringements of the association’s
pricing decisions. For the purpose of the investigation, independent auditors could be
appointed. Any reported violations were to be scrutinised by the council, regardless
of the reputation of the plant or person involved, and the outcome publicised to
all association members. WVES general secretary Köhler expressed his confidence
65 TKA SWB 508, memo by Wolff von Amerongen on the DA meeting 7 Nov. 1961.
66 Whitman, ‘Civility’, 1302. Whitman gives a list of liable insults, which is a full page long, see 1305–6.
67 ACDP 01–224 – 151/2 Diskussionsabend, memo on the meeting 11 Nov. 1958, TOP 8.
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that the mere establishment of the honour council would be enough to stop further
breaches of agreements and restore the trust amongst the steel works.68 He was wrong.
At the Discussion Evening on 10 July 1963, it was confirmed that, after a general
members’ meeting of the WVES on 28 June, the honour council had constituted
itself, consisting of the board of the Rolled Steel Association and Köhler. Its modus
operandi still had to be confirmed by the WVES, which was also considering whether
or not to establish honour councils for the other five sub-associations as well.69 The
procedures determined that the honour council had to assess, on request either by
the chairman of a sub-association or by the board of managers of a member company,
the violation of an association’s decision. That companies were encouraged to inform
on each other was an action unheard of in the association’s history and an action
which was not honourable in any sense. If an accusation was made, the honour
council could bring in independent auditors, and ‘all parties involved’ – the draft
explicitly avoided the term ‘the accused’ – were obliged to co-operate fully and
provide all relevant material. By a majority vote, the council would then make its
decision and inform all the involved parties of the outcome and who had to bear the
cost of the investigation.70
The honour council could impose sanction fines, ranging from DM 10,000 in
minor cases to the complete refund of any illicit rebate plus fines of the same amount,
which were to be ‘voluntarily donated’ to the industry’s scientific foundation, the
Association for the Promotion of Science and Humanities in Germany (Stifterverband
der deutschen Wissenschaft).71 Two months later, and following a first case, the DA
discussed the latest development on the honour council. While Sohl repeated the
potential penalties, which now ranged from monetary fines to output penalties and
even ‘personnel changes’, he declared that fines in themselves were not enough
and that the system should lead to a situation where it was possible to ‘grab the
person concerned by his honour’. In order to increase the deterrent of potential
sanctions, it was decided that if a company was not willing to collaborate, then the
association’s remaining firms should refuse any co-operation or even terminate any
existing collaboration. This would constitute what Sohl in an earlier meeting had
termed ‘group fight’ (Gruppenkampf ). This was a method which had been used by the
steel cartels of the pre-1933 period to enforce cartel discipline. Both of these measures
have to be understood as attempts to restore adherence to group loyalty, or suffering
the loss of honour and integrity if this loyalty was not sustained. The personnel
changes mentioned by Sohl included, in the case of a repeated offence, the sacking of
the sales manager (Verkaufsleiter) by the plant, or, if the board manager responsible for
68 ACDP 01–224 – 151/2 Diskussionsabend, memo on the meeting 11 Nov. 1958, TOP 8.
69 TKA A/30432, Unterlagen für DA am 10 July 1963 bei Elkmann. The other five sub-associations
were for Pig Iron (Roheisen), Stainless Steel (Edelstahl), Steel Pipes (Stahlrohre), Rolling Railway Stock
(Rollendes Eisenbahnzeug) and Wrought Iron (Schmiedestücke).
70 Ibid.
71 ACDP 01–224 – 227/1, passim.
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sales was involved, asking the company’s supervisory board to terminate his contract
immediately.72
At first the attempts to establish price discipline through the establishment of an
honour council had mixed results. During the Discussion Evening on 10 October
1963, Otto Siering of Hüttenwerk Oberhausen declared that his company would
be leaving the Heavy Plate Association (Grobblech-Vereinigung), a sub-association
of the Rolled Steel Association, at the end of the year and would return only if
‘acceptable terms’ were to be restored. When Sohl questioned the other Heavy Plate
Association representatives about the origins of the case, none was prepared to speak
up for fear of further inflaming the situation and Sohl had to conclude that the
previous meetings had been in vain and that the ‘group fight’ might become a real
possibility.73 The news seemed to be better the following month. In a letter to ‘the
gentlemen concerned’ the WVES summed up a meeting on 6 November, in which
all participants had agreed to tighten their business conduct in the rolled steel sector,
to set up an advisory council which would set binding rules on sales policy, and to
implement the honour council.74 This suggests that at least in the short run the threat
of being shamed and fined by the honour council seems to have had an effect and
brought the managers into line.
However, this success lasted only a very short time. By the middle of January 1964,
the honour council had to write to Sohl that they had to deal with a further thirteen
cases involving seven companies but all the cases turned out to be trivial in nature.
In fact, because of long-established trust and business connections, it had proved
impossible to detect any serious cases and thus the council had the feeling that ‘the
little ones were hanged while the big ones got away’. The council also bemoaned
the fact that some managers had refused to give their word of honour when they
were investigated. The men argued that their word of honour was too important to
be used in such minor cases.75 While it may indeed have been possible that some of
them regarded their word of honour still so highly as only to use it in matters of great
consequence, it may also have been the case that this was the easiest excuse not to
give their word in cases where they knew that they would not keep it. Of course, this
could mean that the managers still believed in the value of their word and would not
squander it lightly; on the other hand it confirms that the iron and steel industry’s
traditional associational and market discipline was indeed disappearing.
In 1965, when the oversupply had turned into a full-blown steel crisis, the ‘lack
of honour’ amongst German steel managers reached its lowest point. It had become
obvious that not sales managers but board members were the guilty parties and that
honour council resolutions had to be suspended in order to find out about the scale of
price dumping. At least one member of the management board of Dortmund-Hörder
Hütten Union stated bluntly that he felt no longer bound by any Discussion Evening
72 TKA SWB 509, memo by Wolff von Amerongen on the DA meeting, 10 Sept. 1963.
73 TKA SWB 509, memo by Wolff von Amerongen on DA, 10 Oct. 1963.
74 TKA SWB 509, letter from the Walzstahl-Vereinigung ‘An die beteiligten Herren’, 9 Nov. 1963.
75 ACDP 01–224 – 227/1, Ehrenrat to Sohl und Sendler, 16 Jan. 1964.
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decision.76 Five months later Sohl had to report to the DA about the ‘most shocking
meeting’ of the Rolled Steel Association’s advisory council. All its agreements had
collapsed, despite the fact that all plants had agreed to them through their bosses’
signatures. There was clear evidence that some plants had gone so far as to forge
the production statistics they had to send to the WVES. This meeting found its sad
climax in another outburst of Otto Siering, who flatly refused to participate in any
further meeting of the Heavy Plate Association, because ‘at that table sat men who
only lied.’77 This statement of Siering’s only confirmed the fact that the forging of
production statistics had to come from a company’s top, i.e. the board of managers,
with the decision either taken by an individual or, more likely, a collective board
decision. By this time all trust amongst the honourable gentlemen had been replaced
by mutual suspicion. Despite tougher penalties being introduced in November 1965
by the WVES, prices could eventually only be stabilised temporarily in the following
years through the establishment of four sales offices (Verkaufskontore) through which
all steel would be sold, and by the outside pressure on the German steel industry.78
Considering the previously tight discipline within the industry, the change in
management attitude which caused such drastic measures has to be seen almost as
a paradigm shift. However, it can be easily explained when contrasted with the
industry’s experience over the preceding eighty years or so when the iron and steel
industry had faced an outside enemy which they thought they could only face up
to if they provided a united front.79 In the Imperial era, associations to self-regulate
the steel industry had been seen as a necessity and the only solution to prevent
ruinous competition amongst the steel plants and from abroad, and the companies
had to adhere to association discipline. Under the Weimar system, heavy industry
felt threatened by trade unions, left-wing governments and compulsory arbitration,
which went mostly in favour of labour, resulting, most infamously, in the 1928 ‘Ruhr
iron struggle’ (Ruhreisenstreit). During this conflict the steel plants locked out almost
a quarter of a million workers after the arbitration of an industrial dispute had ruled
against them.80 Following a brief honeymoon, the industry faced massive interference
from the Nazis, culminating in the establishment of the Hermann Göring steel plant
at Salzgitter and the conduct of the Nazi war economy.81 Finally, after the war, the
Ruhr industrialists were confronted with Allied attempts at decartelisation and the
break-up of the naturally grown vertically integrated steel companies of the Ruhr.
After the Federal Republic’s anti-cartel laws had been enacted in 1957 under Erhard’s
‘social market economy’, no more endogenous political threats existed. The booming
76 TKA SWB 510, memo by Wolff von Amerongen on DA on 8 April 1965.
77 TKA SWB 510, memo by Wolff von Amerongen on DA on 8 Sept. 1965.
78 TKA SWB 511, memo by Wolff von Amerongen on DA on 3 Nov. 1965; SWB 512, letter by secretariat
Wolff to DA distribution list members, 15 Aug. 1966, in the attachment a letter by Köhler, 12 Aug.
1966.
79 Plumpe, ‘Unternehmerverbände’, passim.
80 Bernd Weisbrod, Schwerindustrie in der Weimarer Republik: Interessenpolitik zwischen Stabilisierung und
Krise (Wuppertal: Hammer, 1978), 415–56.
81 Gerhard Mollin, Montankonzerne und ‘Drittes Reich’ (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1988).
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economy allowed the broken-up plants to remerge, expand and work much more for
their own benefit. The much reduced need for associational protection and control
would have been conducive to change in managerial attitudes. Although they had
been shaped by the association’s traditions, executives began to operate increasingly
outside their perceived group interests and more for their own firm’s self-interests
and, once the steel market got tougher towards 1960, this new attitude began to
prevail. In anticipation of further expansion of steel demand, company chairmen had
to impress their supervisory boards with ever bigger plans for capacity increases, but
in the face of falling prices the utilisation of the new capacities would have meant
constantly undercutting existing price agreements in order to shift production –
a development that was not lost on industrialists themselves.82 While still opposed
to cut-throat competition, the top managers’ Discussion Evenings and their (semi)
cartel-like agreements could not really offer to bridge the growing gap between the
old and the new system. If one follows Konrad Jarausch’s idea of socio-cultural changes
as gradual processes caused by small, day-to-day experiences, the slow disappearance
of loyalty and honour as a mechanism of group control in the steel industry in the
1950s and 60s is actually not too surprising.83 The ‘social market economy’ allowed
the managers to develop new patterns of behaviour; some of them may have even felt
compelled to break the old rules for the sake of their companies. For example, the
Maxhütte steel plant, part of the Flick group, sabotaged negotiations over the setting
up of the sales offices by demanding 30% higher quotas.84 However, this does not
mean that they gave up on honour altogether, as the examples of social honour and
obligation in this article have shown. Furthermore, Speitkamp provides too many
examples of the continuation of honour as a social force in the Federal Republic as
a whole, despite it having been written off many times.85 People like Sohl took their
honorary chairmanship of company supervisory boards or of associations bestowed
on them during the 1970s quite seriously.
Conclusion
The men who ran German heavy industry during the 1950s and 1960s had their
crucial socialisation experience during the time of the First World War and the
following two decades. Those of them who attended university – and a large share
of the managers in big industry did – would therefore have been involved in the
student honour culture in which duels were only the outward sign of ‘honourable’
conduct. Moreover, their overall habitus and attitude would also have been influenced
by the generation of their predecessors, where bourgeois honour and honourable
conduct would have played perhaps an even larger role. It was the bourgeoisie’s best
means of demarcation against the aristocracy and also other middle-class groups. The
82 TKA SWB 510, memo by Wolff von Amerongen on DA on 14 June 1965.
83 Jarausch, Die Umkehr.
84 TKA SWB 512, memo by Wolff von Amerongen on DA on 10 June 1966.
85 Speitkamp, Ohrfeige, 215–65.
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entrepreneurial professional honour (Standesehre) of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, which derived from the bourgeois attempt to delimit themselves
from the aristocracy, has to be seen as the bedrock and foundation of the workings
of the industrial associations.86
After the Second World War and in the wake of the Nuremberg War Crime
Trials against leading industrialists, West Germany’s business elites were working hard
and spent considerable amounts of money to restore their collective honour, that
is to say in their endeavour to prove that they were not involved with the Nazis.
The post-war period was a time when businessmen rallied once again to protect
themselves and their honour against attacks from outsiders. Consequently, there were
very few cases in which businessmen took action against other businessmen because
of Nazi connections. The exceptional Reusch-Kirchfeld case has shown that even if
action was taken against a fellow businessman it was not driven by retribution for Nazi
sympathies or party membership as such, but came about only if there was a perceived
violation of the group’s code of conduct. Hermann Reusch’s righteous anger about
Kirchfeld’s alleged involvement in the ousting of Paul Reusch shows that ‘honourable’
conduct, namely loyalty, was very much at the heart of the matter, in particular if the
very close relationship between father and son, which Cornelia Rauh has established,
is considered.87 The establishment of an honour court to settle the affair once and
for all shows in this case that both men followed a more traditional honour code –
even if they did not duel as they might have done thirty years previously. Both were
prepared to accept as a binding ruling the decision of a body which had been set up
in order to defend the honourable status of one of them.
Other than spending considerable sums of money at home and abroad on public
relations measures to improve their honourable image, industrialists continued to
regard it as a matter of honour to look after their own when they had fallen on
hard times. The support for Jakob Reichert’s widow in 1948 and for the widow of
the manager deputised to the ECSC highlight this well. In contrast, if someone was
not seen as one of them, they had no hesitation about withholding support or even
taking active steps to bring about the downfall of such an individual, as the case of
Willy Schlieker demonstrates. His shipyard collapsed after his banks, under influence
from some big steelworks, refused to provide bridging loans at a time when Schlieker
had major cash-flow problems.88
The history of the steel industry’s honour council shows the changing link between
group loyalty and honourable behaviour and how these changed during the 1950s.
The WVES’s honour council was no longer used to defend the honour of an
individual member, but used as an instrument to enforce compliance with what had
been defined as the common weal of the steel industry as a whole. It is debatable what
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actually caused this ‘decline’ of the previously fairly solid behavioural code. Possible
explanations are the impact of the Allied-imposed break-up of Germany’s traditional
vertical integration of heavy industry and the Allies’ decartelisation policies, which
found their climax in West Germany’s 1957 anti-cartel law. The impact of these
factors, combined with the effect that the economic boom years of the 1950s had
on the egos of individual company chairmen, is perhaps the most important reason
for the decline of ‘honourable behaviour’ as defined though the common weal of
the steel industry. The fact that the honour council failed to stabilise the steel market
by restoring the traditional group loyalty does not mean that managers in heavy
industry no longer regarded themselves as honourable merchants; their individual
honour, or what they perceived as such, remained unaffected by this development.
Their insistence on the significance of their word of honour proves this. However,
the failure of the honour council also signifies, in particular in big business, a further
shift away from old group and association thinking and Standesehre towards one
of individual company responsibility and a decline in traditional social honour, as
predicted and defined by Max Weber. As such the development contributed to the
‘modernisation’ of German management.
Les ‘hommes d’honneur’: les magnats
de l’industrie lourde allemande et le
rôle de l’honneur et des tribunaux
d’honneur à l’époque d’Adenauer
Selon cet article, les conceptions traditionnelles
de l’honneur et les pratiques sociales qu’elles
ont inspirées chez les magnats de l’acier dans
l’Allemagne de l’après-guerre se sont avérées
durables autant que variables. L’article passe
brièvement en revue le développement de la
notion d’honneur bourgeois jusqu’au début des
années 1950, puis examine le procès de l’un
des barons de l’industrie lourde, Hermann
Reusch, des aciéries Gutehoffnungshütte, dans un
tribunal d’honneur entre 1947 et 1949. Il décrit
enfin la tentative infructueuse par l’association
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Eisen und Stahl d’établir
des conseils d’honneur destinés à mettre en
vigueur une politique des prix. Ces deux épisodes
montrent l’évolution rapide de la culture sociale
et économique dans la RFA du début des années
1960.
‘Ehrenwerte Herren’: westdeutsche
Schwerindustrielle und die Rolle von
Ehre und Ehrengerichte in der
Adenauer Ära
Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass innerhalb der
deutschen Schwerindustrie traditionelle Konzep-
tionen von Ehre und die darauf ruhenden
sozialen Praktiken im Nachkriegsdeutschland
sowohl langlebig als auch veränderlich waren. Nach
einer kurzen Übersicht wie sich bürgerliche Ehre
bis ca. 1950 hin entwickelt hat, wird eine Studie des
Ehrengerichtsfalles eines der führenden Männer
der deutschen Schwerindustrie, Hermann Reusch
von der Gutenhoffnungshütte präsentiert, der sich
von 1947 bis 1949 hinzog. Diesem folgt der letztlich
gescheiterte Versuch der Wirtschaftsvereinigung
Eisen und Stahl, ihre Preispolitik durch die
Etablierung von Ehrenräten durchzusetzen. Beide
Fälle beleuchten, wie schnell sich die soziale und
wirtschaftliche Kultur Westdeutschlands in den
frühen 1960er Jahren änderte.
